



### **Civilization and democracy: the ethnocentric discourse in Social Sciences**

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Every Empire is certainly erected in basis with a sentiment of superiority over the rest of world. This sentiment is based upon what scholars denominate ethnocentrism. To a greater or lesser degree, all civilizations are more and less ethnocentric at time valorizes certain values in detriment of others. Nowadays, the Anglo-Empire (primarily conformed by US and UK) puts emphasis on the terrorism as one of main threats West should face in next years. The World Trade Center's episode marked the end and beginning of a new era wherein the ontological and perceived security played an important role in the international agenda. Countries that prioritized their security as a primary strategy highlighted the needs of a preventive war against terrorist cells in Middle East. Under such a context, the present paper theoretically examines to what an extent the Anglo-centrism not only is still present in Social Sciences but also it determines a discourse wherein the democracy and civilization are valorized over other aspects. To fulfill this goal, we substantially reviewed two important works authored by the political scientist Samuel-Phillip Huntington. *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* and *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. It is important to mention even though there are ethnocentric elements in these early mentioned works, this does not entail Huntington has wittingly elaborated his argument to legitimate the Bush's war-on-terror. Otherwise, we convincingly argue Huntington's thesis has been manipulated by politicians and some scholars to vindicate the „American Way“.

Democracy. Civilization. War. Conflict. Terrorism. September 11. Samuel Phillip Huntington. Ethnocentrism.

#### **Introduction**

It can be hypothesized as evident that globalization triggered a hot debate among scholars in last decades. The pervasive role played by globalization and war on terror has been unearthed a cynic dynamic. Whereas early capitalism encourages the liberal market, trade and connection among different-structured economies, central countries impose serious migration barriers to peripheral migrants (Powell, 2010). The current conceptualization of terror or terrorism should be at least revisited. D. Altheide brings into question to what an extent American and British newspapers covered issues related to crime as a subjective trouble (because it connotes to the idea of victimization) while terrorism is considered not only an unquestionable truth but also as a real hazard for American and European way (Altheide, 2009). In many perspectives, 11/09 has symbolized and resignified the manner how popular wisdom considers terrorism in Us soil and beyond. The discussion here can take two contrasting channels. A couple of thinkers, most of them linked to a major or lesser degree with Government, argue terrorism still is a great challenge and threat for West. Early or later, West and East should mythically encounter in a final fight for the predominance of power in the World. Of course, attacks on World Trade Centered accelerated the times (Fukuyama, 1989) (Huntington, 1993; 1997) (Kristol and Kagan, 1996)

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(Vargas-Llosa, 2002) (Rashid, 2002) (Kepel, 2002) (Keohane and Zeckhauser, 2003) (Susstein, 2005) (Pojman, 2006).

Based on the stimulation of panic to mitigate the counter-effects of global capitalism others more critique scholars do not hesitate to point out WTC and terrorism work as mechanism to generate an internal indoctrination. Since globalization promotes a fluent interaction among countries and people, this process blurs the boundaries of identity in respect of self-hood and otherness. Fear not only would encapsulate the subject's attachment to certain Nation-hood but also would lead persons to trivialize the understanding with their neighbors in order for local aristocracies gain more acceptance and legitimacy. Substantially, Mass-Media that represented global corporations are functional to the interests of elites. That way, terrorism becomes in a new way of entertainment fabricated and broadcasted by Media as a „spectacle of disaster“ (Somnez, 1998) (Altheide, 2006; 2009) (Sontag, 2002) (Holloway and Pelaez, 2002) (Zizek, 2009) (Bernstein, 2006) (Baudrillard, 1995a; 1995b; 2006) (Smaw, 2008) (Corey, 2009) (Wolin, 2010).

In addition, it is interesting to note how existent current manipulation of images potentiates the effects of terrorism to the extent a person who had never been experienced a terrorist attack can take fright at being a future target. This means that images created strong links between security and terrorism. Suicide terrorist are mythically depicted as staunch enemies (systematic killer) of development and democracy whose goals are aimed at destroying the Western civilization and its cultural values. This sentiment is often associated to a much broader state of anxiety and paranoia that potentiates the effects of terrorism (Howie, 2009). Theoretical appliances of preventive war are self-defeating for US and Europe because not only it posed their economies in a difficult position but also weakens the bridge of a frank dialogue. Totalitarian Regimes historically opted for preventive wars in order for them to gain more power and legitimacy (Gray, 2007).

Nevertheless, both agree to highlight this phenomenon epitomized after the Soviet Union collapse and the end of Cold-War. Under this circumstance, the present paper explores the limitations of the Anglo-centrism discourse enrooted in the works of Samuel Phillips Huntington along with the violence, religion, democracy, development, politics and terrorism. First of all, we will exhaustively address the Clash of Civilization and The Third Wave wherein our American political scientist devotes considerable attention to the role played by democracy in west as a form of social development and resentment in East as a reactionary form of protest. On an ultimate facet, we will contrast Huntington's theses with the last contributions of S. Zizek and C. Castoriadis. The question as to why democracy can alleviate the resentment of third world countries is still unresolved.

### **Preliminary Discussion about the Ethnocentric Discourse**

Ethnocentrism can be defined as „*the tendency to believe the own cultural values are unique and superior to others*“. At least, this used definition can be read at the dictionary I have on my hands. To be honest, there was not surprising to note this term was originally coined by Anthropology and Ethnology during XVIII and XIXth centuries. At a first glance, colonialism and anthropology were inextricably interconnected. This does not mean necessarily that anthropology paved the pathway for colonialism but at least the former was functional to the interests of the latter. At the beginning of XIX century, first anthropologists were enrooted in the belief that the advance of industrialism not only would be irreversible but also would generate disappearance of many non-western cultures. The first ethnologies, as Harris put it, were lawyers interested in questions of heritage, lineage and patrimony (Harris, 2006).

Based on „the yearning of protection“ to create a discipline which helps native to alleviate the negative effects of industrialization, pioneer ethnologists and archeologists contemplated the odds to collect as much as possible lore, customs, artifacts, devices and habits of these cultures in bias of extinction. The inception of otherness was ethnocentrically accompanied with a cynic paternalism. Social Scientists were enrooted in the belief that human beings can be differentiated depending on their degree of development. In parallel with the Darwinism and eugenics, anthropology and ethnology insisted on a supposed biological and cultural superiority of ones human beings over others. Following the example of animals that Darwin illustrated, humanity was grouped by different types of races which distinguished each others by a supposed degree of intelligence.

For a theory elaborated in North-Europe, it was not surprising to note eugenicists emphasized on the idea whites and Anglo-Saxons showed to have a top-ranked level of intelligence while blacks and Asians were considered with less rationality or even under the line of humanity. One of the concerns

characterized the beginning of anthropology was the compulsory need to protect the non-Western cultures of the inevitable disappearance due to capitalism advance. Underpinned in the belief that exotic cultures will decline at the time industrialism advances, Europe paternalism triggered an uncanny obsession in academicians for protecting and collecting devices and artifacts of remote Australia, Africa and even South America. In the continuum of development and civilization, Europe must save the rest of the globe from their backwardness. This type of paternalism not only has survived long time throughout the European scholarship but also was the prerequisite for the inception of a new term subordinated to the international financial organisms: *the development*.

Development was historically a term coined by American President Truman who in a political discourse of 1949 said that developed countries should be willing to help and give assistance to those countries wherein population basic needs still remained uncovered. From that day onwards, anthropology of development debated in depth to what an extent while some societies export pleasure and style of life forging a global identity, others societies adopt these guides internally increasing the dependence and shaping new hybrid cultures. This point in part explains the reasons as to why a much more migrants depart from home in search of an opportunity in United States and Europe (Escobar, 1997) (Viola, 2000) (Esteva, 2000). In addition, Esteva (2000) and Escobar (1997) acknowledged that development can contribute improving material situations in the case of stakeholders were not subject to a previous economic dependence. This usually happens because undeveloped societies incur in an excessive need to receive financial assistance in many cases based on high interests impossible to return at a later date. As a whole, financial facilities of loans, initially placed for assistance of under-developed countries, resulted in a debt almost impossible to break. However, afterwards Adam Smith liberal doctrine predicts that any country that is under-developed can change its situation whether maintain a fluid commerce and interaction with developed countries. Even if this appears to be an inadequate theory, many scholars still admit that development only may be possible accompanied with others follow-up measures (Esteva, 2000).

Expertise in Europe and United States emphasized on development and rationalization as vehicles towards progress, improvement and sustainability. Failures in the application of financial programs for enhancement in peripheral countries are of course evident. Under these circumstances, immediately involving Banks haired anthropologists, sociologists and psychologist to explain the reasons as to why applied plans for development failed to be relief poverty or mitigates their effects in third World. These practitioners reported that one of the problems emergent societies have to become in a developed country is often associated with structural cultural glitches such as corruption, authoritarianism, political instability, intertribal disputes, and lack of perspective for rationalization (Esteva, 2000). Once again, the lines of European Hegemony wove a new discourse to legitimate the inequalities of its policies. Many others scholars like Schnapper denounces that the doctrine of rationalization permits understanding how development works in industrialized countries based on the „shortage economic thesis“. The exacerbation of rationalization and efficiency in administrative issues is inherited linked to a need for centralizing certain material resources at the time others less important should be privatized. For American ethnocentrism, „Be developed“ seems to be an exclusive virtue, sign of a much broader moral superiority. Polemically, the point is that not all societies have been certainly industrialized in the same degree (Schnapper, 1988) as these liberal scholars initially set forth.

There are at least three main reasons why the globalization has enlarged the previous inequalities between riches and pours. The first refers to tremendous economic gains are associated to competitive assets. Education, human capital and entrepreneurial skills play a pivotal role in distribution of wealthy preventing the rural migration to urban areas. Secondly, the global market are imperfects and fail in many social domains such as the pollution wherein some center countries capture the benefits and other more peripheral only face the costs. Third and most important, globalization replicates the material imbalances because trade and migration are functional to the power of privileged mega-corporations (Birdsall, 2001) (Birdsall, 2006). Therefore, one might speculate that the multilateral efforts conducted by industrialized countries to expand development throughout the world as a form of improvement were not only an illusion but also a cynic instrument for domination.

In a similar vein, Corbalan (2004) brings into question the pervasive role played by United States between 1980 and 1990 in duplicating the assistance in loans to Latin America and Africa without any type of control. United States not only altered the ideology of conquest but also replaced the old discourse of race and evolution by other newer intended to emphasize on governability, rationalization, democracy and development. Next, we will examine how this discourse is still in the core of Social Science in Unites States in so far being witness as a notable scholar of the caliber of Samuel Huntington (lecturer at Harvard's University) considered „terrorism“ as a mere reaction product of authoritarian

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cultural values. Much more interested in the issues linked sovereignty and homeland's security than expanding the understanding of facts, his partial lecture of history is a classical proof that demonstrates how the European and American scholarship become functional to the political interests of central countries. One of the main characteristics of ethnocentric discourse seems to be a tendency to naturalize the inequalities resulted from the current social ways of productions. Today, the issues related to the race have set the pace to problems enrooted in cultural assets, the culture or better said the cult of culture has replaced to race as a main criterion of social distinction (Rigby, 1986) (Miles, 1999) (Taubes, 2008).

Ultimately, it is note-worthy to denote that liberalism and free-will are social construes aimed at reinforcing the current productive forces linked in liberal market. In this sense, democracy not only is the regime of government of liberality but also of global bank systems which under the pretext of rationalization centralize a greater quota of capital and power. D. Weitzner and J. Darroch re-addresses the concepts of financial failures coined by A. Greenspan along with the last financial crash in United States, considering that one of the relevant aspects to keep in mind is the moral failure that almost always precedes a financial bankruptcy. Democracies, and of course, deliberative democracies have serious problems to regulate the individual greed and in consequence are hand-tied to fore-cast when the next crisis will take room. This destabilizes governments not only in the center but also bestowing the terrible costs to peripheral developing countries (Weitzner and Darroch, 2009). This means that the blind trust of Huntington in liberal democracy, economy and markets should be at least re-visited. Whether we contemplate the development from a moral and ethic point of view, U.S and liberalism are underdeveloped.

### **Considering Religion as the cause of inter-civilization's conflict**

Preliminary, Huntington goes on to say *„In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural identities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their kin countries“*(Huntington, 1997, 28). Under this perspective, his main thesis is aimed at emphasizing on cultural identities as the prerequisite of social conflict. After the Second War and Post cold War, cultural identities shape, elaborate and disintegrate the ethnic cohesion as well as fabricate new targets for the direction of violence. We are witness of how the class of civilizations can encourage or erodes the scaffolding of societies.

With this background in mind, our Harvard's professor surmises countries with cultural compatibilities are prone to give cooperation each other while countries with cultural differences also should be ripe to the conflict. After the end of Soviet Union, world has been splited in 7 parts which are civilization: Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese and of course West shaped by USA, Australia and Western Europe. Our author considers that the success or failure of democracy as a supreme value depends on to major o lesser degree with the cultural structure of involving country. For instance, the spirit of democracy in Middle East was unfeasible because the action of Islam as main religion. Centered on the contributions of F. Fukuyama, Huntington argues that after all the end of history means no other thing than achievements of global democracy. Even though there would remain rests of totalitarian ideologies even within US soil, the cold-war's end signified the triumph of liberal democracy in the world. These seven or eight civilizations alternate forces of integration with forces of disintegration. Religion under these circumstances plays a pivotal role in revitalizing these underlying incognuences that leads directly towards conflict and ethnic disputes.

Following this reasoning, Huntington is certainly convinced a civilization can be defined as group imbedded in history. *„the idea of civilization was developed by eighteen-century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of barbarism . Civilized society differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban and literate. To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad. The concept of civilization provided a standard by which to judge societies, and during the nineteenth century, Europeans devoted much intellectual, diplomatic and political energy to elaborating the criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently civilized to be accepted as members of European-dominated international system“*(Huntington, 1997, 41).

The fact is that civilization should be seen in plural, to be precisely, as a way of cultural entity. Whatever a society considers of importance such as the technology, norms, values, mythology connote what anthropologists call the culture. For that reason, culture and civilization should be conceptually

dissociated. Both share similar functions for social day-to-day life, namely to bring order or at least certain understanding to the events. Civilization seems to be a lapse of creativity based on a previous process of territorialization. Huntington, in this vein, abandons the classical belief of race as the only requisite of ethnic affiliations embracing the idea that countries formed by different races can share the same civilization while two dispersed civilizations can share similar racial roots. See for example the case of Latin American countries: „*Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West. Although an offspring of European Civilization, Latin America has evolved along every different path from Europe and North America. It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe had to a much lesser degree and North America at all*“ (Huntington, 1997, 46).

This simple and ad-hoc definition about Latin American civilization tarnishes his findings because of many reasons. First of all, it very hard to affirm a culture can be authoritarian or democratic without any serious empirical-basis. Democracies can be so totalitarian as monarchies and vice-versa. Democracy only is based on a structuration of authority. Secondly, he erroneously assumes that Europe had a long Republican tradition while Latin America was certainly submerged in a set of anti-democratic riots or revolutions. That way, cultural preconditions of a country or a civilization would predispose individual or social personalities. Whether US is recognized to be a democratic society also an American is liberal while an Muslim or a Latin American seems to be authoritarian.

On the other hand, concerns of Huntington regarding the invasion of a foreign language in US are unquestionable. Whereas the elite exert influence on populace with respect to certain fashionable tendencies, a foreign language marks the difference between aristocracies and the rest of population. „*Global communications are one of the most important contemporary manifestations of Western power. This western hegemony, however, encourages populist politicians in non-western societies to denounce Western cultural imperialism and to rally their publics to preserve the survival and integrity of their indigenous culture. The extent to which global communications are dominates by the West is, thus, a major source of the resentment and hostility of non-Western peoples against the West*“ (Huntington, 1997, 59). Languages define the identity of native speakers but it is a clear mistake to consider a civilization might be determined by certain religion or language as unique criterion. In addition, similarities or disparities in culture can be seen as a result of human interaction and not necessarily because of ethnicity correlation

For example, Sami-People and Saxon have coexisted in Sweden by thousand of years. Interrelated by a similar anthropomorphic looks or even certain resemblances in economy and the scaffolding of their families, both ethnic groups do not pertain to the same linguistic root. This would reflect only one thing, resemblance are not scientifically correlative with ethnic affiliation but also only a question of morphological adaptation to the environment wherein these two collectives evolved. Here Huntington seems to fail in the same error of C. Lévi-Strauss and French structuralism noted and denounced by American anthropologist Mary Douglas a couple of decades back (Levi-Strauss, 1991; 1992; 2002; 2003) (Douglas, 1996). In addition, even if Huntington intends to review an erudite body of knowledge and studies his development lacks of scientific accuracy and adequacy. After all, he is unable to provide with scientific and necessary elements in order for reader to identify how a civilization may surface and of course how it declines.

### **Why should Civilizations Clash?**

Whether the concept of civilization examined is troublesome, the clash of civilization is no less polemic. The interaction between civilizations which do not have the same characteristics can be a potential reason for future conflicts. In these terms, inasmuch as the tourism, migration or liberal market consolidate their hegemony and power in countries more likelihood to suffer a clash among civilizations. S. Huntington needs to admit „*There is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples - trade, investment, tourism, media, Electronic Communications generally - is generating a common World culture. Improvements in transportation and communication technology have indeed mate it easier and cheaper to move money, goods, people, knowledge, ideas, and images around the World. No doubt exists as to the increased international traffic in these items. Much doubt exists, however, as to the impact of this increased traffic. Does trade increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict?*“ (Huntington, 1997, 67).

The modernization of West can be explained by means of interaction among countries. Although the interaction does not facilitate the development in such it transfers techniques of innovation, inventions, and new practices from one society to another. Second difference is related to the fact modern societies are based on industry while traditional ones refer to agriculture as their mainstream industry. Societies

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characterized by agricultural activities centralize their authority along with the owner of soil. Government and social structure seem to be determined by the economy activities predominate in each society. Rather, industry is less dependant of natural environment and recurs to free-will to justify the channels wherein existent decision-makings and consumption are ushered. Industrial-based communities are prone to embrace democracy as their primary form of government. In recent decades, we have witnessed how expansion of Western has created modernization in the World expanding democracies beyond the European boundaries. Of course, Huntington stresses, by exemption of Middle East and Muslim-based societies. The problem with terrorism connotes a much broader deep-seated issue that represents ongoing rejection of Islam against the Westernization process. These both contrasting values are being disputed in terrorism issues.

From this perspective, our Harvard' professor is convinced westernization embraces a process of modernization that not all countries in third world embrace: *„in the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer“* (Huntington, 1997, 76). One might see whether this speech is followed to the end, it is implicitly hypothesized that terrorism not only is a counter-force emerged from Westernization that jeopardizes the freedom and democracy but also it becomes in a social or psychological pathology caused by the resentment. This would erroneously mean that only in traditional societies religions still predominate. The theories of secularized world from the development of Huntington have serious limitations to explain why United States' government (as the case of Bush) utilizes the religion for their „preventive“ war on terror. Whenever, former president George W. Bush referred to North-Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq, he verbalized „the axis of evilness“. Under what argument Huntington can support his thesis that westernization and religion diverge by different pathways?

The distribution of cultures reflects how the power is distributed. This is because culture is prone to seek for power. *„throughout history the expansion of the power of a civilization has usually occurred simultaneously with the flowering of its culture and has almost always involved its using that power to extent its values, practices and institutions to other societies“* (Huntington, 1997, 91). The erosion of West's power in armies, investment in security and trade seems to be proportional to the increase of East in the same aspects. The declination of West as a ubiquitous civilization is accompanied with the rise of non-western aboriginal cultures. Huntington dwells on in the envy these non-western feel by democratization and modernization process. Basically, should our American political scientist admits, *„for several centuries non-Western peoples envied the economic prosperity, technological sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western Societies. They sought the secret of his success in Western values and institutions, and when they identified what they though might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies“* (Huntington, 1997, 93). The concept of power in Huntington maintains certain resemblance with the hobessian passage from the state of nature to civilization. The power is such to the extent it exerts influence (instrumentalization) over others persons. This leads to people in a two-fold nature, aversion and appetite for the properties of neighbors.

The paradox lies in the following situation. At the time, a non-western society made the necessary endeavor for democratization a new risk is reactively reopened because dissidents rivals with democratic countries. Anti-western activists are also in power by the same mechanism Western societies promote once democracy is embraced. That way, the propensity for colonial expansion has been surely their bankruptcy of European and West cultures. This striking and interesting thesis has not debated considerably in academy. The resurgence of religion plays a crucial role in the process of nationalisms. Continuous crises of identity triggered by Capitalism have resulted in a declination of political authority and self-trust. Psychologically, fundamentalism should embrace the religions or part of their doctrines in order for them to prevent or disintegrate the existent but weak social bondage. In terms of our author, *„ the most obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the process of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Longstanding sources of identity and system of authority are disrupted. People move from countryside into de city, become separated from their roots, and take new jobs or no jobs. They interact with large numbers of strangers and we are exposed to new sets of relationships. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs“* (Huntington, 1997, 97).

Examining the conceptual limitations of J. Rawls in respect to Civil Disobedience, a concept that will be not developed here and now because of time and spaces issues, P. Moraro brings into question to what extent totalitarian regimes are interrelated in complicity with terrorism since both are of course dependant. Terrorism gives to aristocracies the necessary conditions and reasons, in order for a totalitarian State to concentrate the coactions as well as the usage of force univocally not only rivaling with terrorists but also with other dissident voices (Moraro, 2007). This idea begs us with a question very hard to respond, are terrorism and democracy the two sides of the same coin?

## Democracies and Inequalities

It is important not to loose the sight during 1970s and 80s many countries has democratized in the world wherein predominated the roots of Christianity. This was the case of a whole part of Latin America, Spain, Portugal Central and Southern of Europe with a strong basis of Catholicism. The process of democratization played a crucial role in the development of involved countries. This point reflects a previous interconnection between democracy and totalitarianism with religion. One might not being shocked when come across with excerpt like this: *„Democratization was most successful in countries where Christian influences were strong. New Democratic regimes appeared most likely to stabilize in the Southern and Central European countries that were predominantly Catholic or Protestant, and less certainly, in Latin American countries“*(Huntington, 1997, 193). A provocative and polemic idea of this nature is developed in a second work entitled *The third Wave* wherein our „sociologist of cabinet“ flourished all his Anglo-centrism. Democracy as we know today stems from a tradition coined in Greece. With this in mind, Huntington acknowledges that if democracy only functions as procedural elections this is a minimal definition. For other hand, it is really that *„government produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such government undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can be only understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political system“* (Huntington, 1993, 10). One of most important tenets of democracy seems to be the power (once again present in the argument of Huntington). Whether this is concentrated or not in few hands plays a pivotal role the meaning of democracy. It can be said that each democracy wave is reversed by a counter-force of totalitarianism. Europe and the World witnessed two tries of democratization corresponded with two reversed waves of fascisms. The scheme drew below most exemplify what we have mentioned.

First, Long wave of democratization 1828 - 1926

Firs reverse wave 1922 - 1942

Second, short wave of democratization 1943 - 1962

Second, reverse wave 1958 - 1975

Third wave of democratization 1974 -

After further examination, Huntington sees how a cyclical process of peace and war operate in the core of democratized societies. Our cabinet Social scientist admires the political system of US to the extent to say that America should be contemplated as „the premier democratic country“ because it is closely associated to freedom of individual rights. For other hand, he is convinced that *„political stability and form of government are as was pointed out, two different variables. Yet they are also interrelated. Democracies are often unruly, but they are not often politically violent. In the modern world democratic systems tend to be less subject to civil violence than are non-democratic system. Democratic governments use far less violence against their citizens than do authoritarian ones. Democracies also provide accepted channels for the expression of dissent and opposition within the system. Both government and opposition thus have fewer incentives to use violence against each other. Democracy also contributes to stability by providing regular opportunities for changing political leaders and changing political policies. In democracies, change rarely occurs dramatically overnight; it is almost always moderate and incremental. Democratic systems are much more immune to major revolutionary upheaval than authoritarian ones“*(Huntington, 1993, 29).

With this argument in mind, he dwells on why some societies which had had authoritarian form of government became in democratic in a specific lapse of time.

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By profiling a lot of theories aimed at explaining this issue, our American sociologist recognizes first and second wave of democratization corresponded with the following combined causes:

A high overall level of economic wealth; Actions of Market economy; Process of industrialization, urbanization and emergence of bourgeoisie; Advent of Middle Class as a developed group; Gradual decreasing of economic inequalities; And ultimately, traditions of respect of law and individual right inherited to Protestantism; Ally victory in First and Second War.

The case in Latin America seems to be uncanny and different in comparison with the rest of world because democratization's process alternated cyclical patterns of back and forth between authoritarian (sectors accustomed to govern by coups) and democratic systems. It is important not to lose the sight of this following excerpt, *„these countries tended to oscillate between more populist democratic governments and more conservative military regimes. Under democratic regime radicalism, corruption, and disorder reach unacceptable levels and the military overthrow it, to considerable popular relief and acclaim. In due course, however, the coalition supporting the military regime, unravels, the military regime fails to deal effectively with the country's economic problems, professionally inclined military officers become alarmed at the politicization of the armed forces, and again, to great popular relief and acclaim, the military withdraw from and are pushed out of office“*(Huntington, 1993, 42). This means that these emergent countries do not really alternate with one or other system, both (totalitarianism and democracy) coexist inside them. Depending upon the economic problems involving country face, radical shift and popular claims emerge overtly or are of course silenced.

However, this explanation does not suffice to give more understanding to current issues of democracy. First of all, Huntington lacks of neither a coherent and scientific basis of his theses about Third World nor a definition of democracy, this happens because throughout the book there is no sustainable historical roots of how has emerged and collapse the democracy in Greece. Secondly, Huntington supports his observation with universal and global considerations that encompasses a mixture of classical prejudices enrooted in American ethnocentrism (as we, the west are democratic and the emergent countries are totalitarian, and of course this explains why they are poor and resent or Third world is underdeveloped due to cultural issues) with a cut understanding of history.

That way, Huntington sees in Third World and of course in its relationship with barbarity what he wants to see. Whether civilization and Western is marked by democracy and development, in the other side of river barbarians are characterized by the lack of freedom, totalitarian political regimes with the consequent economic backwardness. After all, famine in world (for his perspective) was not a result of West's hegemony and injustices created by capitalism but it was circumscribed to cultural incompatibilities of poor States with rationalization and development (this point of view not only nourishes an old discourse, but also reinforces unnecessary stereotypes which balks a scientific reading of this concern). For that reason, a much more complex explanation is needed to unravel to what extent Huntington is right or only revitalizes European prejudices. Furthermore, abundant literature in Social Sciences has studied how idealized democracy in first World even US becomes in a process wherein riches accumulates the power and participates proactively financing the candidatures of politicians. The so-called free press seemed not to be so free since it is related to the economic interests and agenda of elites (Hertz, 2001) (Klein, 2002). Sobhan warns about the counter-effects of globalization in peripheral countries regardless the regime they have. One of the globalization's aspects is interrelated to the impact of governance in democratic countries reducing the sphere of public decision-making to the extent of being mere puppets of trade; the process of globalization contributes to the erosion of democracy because weaken State's legitimacy and of course reproducing the logic of reactionary totalitarianism. What Huntington and liberal academicians forget is that *„this erosion in state legitimacy has, in turn, compromised the quality of governance in particular countries and weakened their capacity to implement reform process. The extent to which freedom of action is compromised naturally depends on the economic structures of a country as well as the strength of its democratic institutions and capacity of effective governments“* (Sobhan, 2003, 5). This explanation very well upends the previous speech given by Huntington. Democracy is not declining because of authoritarian drives inherited on cultural values but also by the expansion of a market which is amoral, impersonal and cold to humankind necessities. For other hand, an empirical case presented by D. Pick, K Dayaram and B. Butler suggested that globalization and neo-liberalism creates serious risk for the development of rural zones. Centered on a rapid but ephemeral economic boom, neoliberal policies in Pilbara Australia declined the solidarity of residents, weakened the democratic institutions and enlarged the unmet social needs (Pick, Dayaram and Butler, 2008). Their findings sharply contrast with the argument of Huntington along with the democracy and liberal economy of market.



Among factors which contributed formally to the third wave, Huntington mentions, higher levels of economic wellbeing which have been ushered in education and urbanization, a middle class which strengthen the consumption, and of course the „development“ of values that were supportive to democracy, radical shifts in leaders in Catholic Church, and a widespread snowballing effects allowed the emergence of democratic preregimes in Spain, Portugal, Argentina and Poland, a supposed heroic role played by US in the expansion of democracy in the Globe. But mysteriously, he prefers to ignore the fact that „black community“ accessed to the rights of Whites no later than 50 years. The concept of American democracy has many ethic problems at time of being applied in practical issues even in its own soil. The Anglo centrism present in Huntington was criticized not only by E. Said but also by A. Sen because his thesis about the Clash of civilization lacks of scientific basis. This rests on shaky foundations to the extent Edward Said wrote an essay ironically entitled „The Clash of Ignorance“ wherein Said considers Huntington’s aprioristic categorizations are not really in connection with the culture. His imagination of the World is aimed at legitimizing the foreign policies of US (Said, 2001). For other some scholars, Huntington from Harvard office was more dangerous by his words and the discourse he defends than the bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With this background in mind, T. Veremis coincides with previous scholars that the Huntington’s, account seems to be weak and generalized in the simplification of certain facts projecting mythical prophecies about a final conflagration between the forces of West and East. Even, what he considers the Islam compounds by a set of different ethnicities in historical disputes with their neighbors for long time. It is surprising to scare for a next clash of civilization whenever the First and Second Wars in Europe caused more than 100 million dead. Following this, Veremis clarifies that Huntington is mistaken in arguing we are experiencing a conflict of inter-civilization, this conflict is intracivilisational. Starting from the erroneous premise, Western civilization is based on values such as individualism, liberalism, human rights, liberty, equality, democracy, secularization and free markets, the others should be placed in opposition adopting a paranoiac mentality of West vs. East (Veremis, 2009).

Following Lafont’s argument regarding the deliberative democracy, it almost impossible or at least utopian to figure out a global democracy wherein the self-determination of lay people with democratic control converges. This means no other thing than at the time democracy organizes other countries and of course the style of life of the new citizens more control and pressure is needed. Starting from the premise that democracy is often characterized by aspirations to freedom, it is paradox to see its own expansion suggests the idea of exerting more coaction. For that reason, expansion of democracy is so authoritarian so those regimes this form of government is geared to fight. Other troubling point of entry seems to be the contrast between global and local perspectives in the formation of democratic regimes. Whether one may argue that democracy encourages the self-determination of citizens in participating into political decision-making and public sphere, this belief paves the ways towards the creation of local forms of government. Otherwise, if we are prone to create a global government encompassing the different local forms of organizations such individual self-determination should be diminished. Anyway, if this happens we will be witnessing the advent of a totalitarian regime. That way, the paradox of binary association democracy/authoritarianism is often misplaced into the interpretation of law. This idea ushers to a much broader dissociation between the figure of State and Democracy (Lafont, 2010). In next sections, we will put under the lens of scrutiny the stances of two well-known scholars such as Cornelius Castoriadis and Slavoj Zizek. Both have substantially contributed to an all-encompassed compression of how worked democracy and authoritarianism in our postmodern world.

### **The Concept of Real Democracy in Cornelius Castoriadis**

By keeping with the role played by democracies in ancient World, C. Castoriadis, a specialist in these themes, argues that the Greek tradition is born after the advent of Homer Chronicles. From that day onwards, the social imaginary experienced a radical shift respecting essence of things and their depiction. The process of acculturation in Western culture received from Greece some values and surely discarded others. This type of selectivity remind us how Judaism leaves the Astronomy and Mathematics of their neighbor Babylonia and Syria while Romans are strongly interested in learning arts, philosophy and rights but there are no one who is concerned in Greek Geometry. The question as to why civilizations filter some values in detriment of others is unresolved in the development of Castoriadis. Rather, his thesis is that the spirit of Greece was founded on the significance of democracy and legislation. The honor for the law represents the essence of humanity.

On The Odyssey, whenever Ulysses visits the land of Cyclopes, Homer describes their habits and customs as monsters or appalling (with a large eye in the mid of head) without laws, or assemblies where issues

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can be debated by all members of community. Rules are often for Greek World this aspect that determines the boundaries between humanity and inhumanity. Monstrosity is often associated to another who does not share the same heritage with respect to politics organizations. Greece undoubtedly saw with certain admiration some barbarians who do not speak Greek but this was not a criterion of exclusion or fear; the term barbarian (*barbaroi*) was not necessarily pejorative. Of course, this was the case of Persia or Egypt. Both early mentioned countries had laws and a large tradition in legislation that perhaps captivated Greeks.

In the seminar of first day of December in 1982, Castoriadis argues that one of the respects that characterized tragedy is the presence of certainness in the future of hero. Unlike the drama wherein the suspense opens the doors of destiny taking in consideration that hero can avoid to his own death following the principle of contingency, the tragedy is circumscribed to a closed end that involved hero ignores but it is known for the rest of audience or readers. No matter the decision-making process, fate has been determined in the tragedy; things did not happen in other way than done. In a sharp contrast with Christianity which puts emphasis on the role played by god in predestination for humans, Greek mythology does understand that Gods are unable to change the destiny of humanity as well as their own one. Destiny transcends the will of god and human beings. Here, also, in other words, the lack contingency in tragedies is the reason why Aquiles or Oedipus cannot escape to their „moira“ (a term linked to fortune we have already seen). For Ancient Greek, the concept of moira means the immanency of death for all beings. Even, the gods (in their immortality) were not beyond the action of moira (fate). Destiny encompasses everything in homer tradition but mysteriously not the law. One of the characteristics that separate Greece from the rest of ancient mythical structures is the lack of revelation and prophecies about future. Since Greek mythology does not refer to a world created for humans, they comprehend that the body of laws is the only instruments capable to give order in politics fields. Even though, the predestination and divination were two wide-spread customs in order for solicitants to make business or face certain threats, nobody in Greece might have consulted these techniques to promulgate the laws. From this perspective, Castoriadis dwells on in those points that outline the main heritage of Ancient Greece. Among the contributions of this civilization we find the agonal competition for glory and fame, the quest of trust, the tension between essence and presence (*doxa* and *nomos*) and finally a determination for democracy. Here a point that merits a certain degree of consideration, what is the relation between fate and competition? The criticism against the social imaginary is intertwined to indetermination of what never has certainly existed. Greek philosophy wakes up as a counter-act to the explanation of what we call the no-being (nothing). The abyss of what does not exist gains considerable force and acceptance for philosophers because of two reasons. The world created without a specific goal does not warranty to human beings the protection they need. For that it represents a hostile and awful place to be. The only way to face the threats coming from environment is the institution of a covenant between the community's members. Neither Plato nor Heidegger appreciates the exact essence of democracy and politics in their developments. As Y. Oikonomou put it, *„in fact for Castoriadis politics is the conscious, critical and self-critical, rational, collective activity and inquiry, regarding the institution of society in whole or in part. In this sense, politics emerges when the question of the validity of the institution is posed, i.e., if and why the institutions are just: are the laws just?, is our Constitution just?, is it good. Good in relation to what? Constructed, which therefore presuppose the questioning of existing institutions – even if it means their acceptance in whole or in part“*(Oikonomou, 2005, 6).

Following this argument, politics depends on the liability of people regarding to the public sphere. Social institutions facilitate the autonomy of citizenship before to the affairs they should daily face. Assembly constitutes the body where persons can debate and legislate about their problems, about the things which jeopardize their own style of life or their institutions (dangers). Castoriadis is one of scholars who note that magistrates in Ancient Greece were randomly chosen. The transference of power to representatives or politicians was not by the institution of popular vote. For that reason, Castoriadis realizes that the democracies do not give certainness about efficiency and efficacy in politics fields. Enrooted in the belief that democracy can assure a well-being for all members of assembly looks to be false, Castoriadis reminds us otherwise this was a modern idea emerged after the distortion of Plato and stoicism about the Republic. Unlike Judaism which promises a better life in heaven, in Greek mythology there is nothing once dead that encourages an improvement for the bad conditions this world offer. Even if Castoriadis is not able to precise why this rupture occurs only in Greece, he gives a fine excuse about how philosophy and religion changed the politic fields to the extent of shaping the essence of democracy and tragedy. What is innate to Greece is not other thing that the lack of warranty of a betterness before to the representation of no-sense. The religion, for them, put efforts in laws and demos to achieve the necessary steps to transform the environment in a safer site. In this point, Gods are entities who help, guide, prescript or injure humans but do not determine how they can behave.

## Reconsidering the essence of Violence in Slavoj Zizek

The modern propensity to exercise violence under the figure of sovereignty is circumscribed to the manipulation bio-power and the principle of shortage which is based on the notion of uncertainty and contingency. That way, Slavoj Zizek considers that the risk, hazards and fear are functional to the monopoly of power of certain groups. From the Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem to the postmodern terrorism, the bourgeois culture characterizes by an excess of instrumentalism and rationalization. For that reason, the symbolic imposition of meaning constitutes as the primary form of violence West cynically exert over the rest of globe. Charity, sympathy and victimization play an important role in order for elite to maintain their status-quo. The shocking for disasters, calamities and tragedies prevent people to understand the real causes that led towards such a situation (Zizek, 2009, 12). The horror of violence backs on what is-not-said of that acting of violence. In this point, academician's thesis become ideological discourses not necessarily for what they stress but for what they silenced. Ideology works as a dream, whereas the surface remains credible the core is false.

The notion of false urgency is coined in observance of the last natural and made-man disaster ranging from the current Haiti's earthquake or Katrina's hurricane in US. Whenever these type of tragic events whip to poorer sector of the society, people donate their own properties in assistance of victims or survivors. It is not surprising to see a considerable volume of aid and money is bestowed to peripheral countries in moment of human emergency. Nonetheless, far-away of reversing the miserable conditions these countries stand, these types of assistance campaigns are often aimed at reinforcing the financial dependence. Ironically, a businessman seems to be more concerned today by helping others than enhancing its profits. However, this is only an illusion, the corporation only appeal to charity as a form of reinforcing the cultural values that made the disaster possible.

From this perspective, Zizek distinguishes two sort of violence, objective and subjective. The former refers to the violence exerted by the system by means of ideology, police and State whereas the latter denotes the possibility to identify and demonize to whom we consider the source of violence. For example, in America Islamic terrorists are deemed as the responsible of 9/11 attacks (subjective violence), this is the violence they feel in their kin. Secondly, objective violence seems to be invisible because it stems from the intromission of United States' government in Middle East issues. For Zizek, subjective and objective violence are inextricably intertwined. For that reasons, scholars who denounce the violence received by Middle East (enrooted in cultural differences or clash or civilizations not only are completely wrong, they are exerting objective violence). One of Zizek upshots is that postmodernity is blurring the boundaries between victims and culprits. The Israel which should suffer the Nazi's holocaust is accomplishing the same techniques of tortures on Palestine's population. Similar examples apply on Leopold II and Congo's humanitarian disasters or even the last Nobel prize of peace earned by B. Obama. Under such a context, the modern fear creates a bridge between two realms. For one hand, we have the outsider world wherein predominate the violence, chaos and complexity. For the other, our home where prevails a sentiment of security and intimacy. Authenticity only is feasible by means of the ongoing articulation of what is fearsome in this world. The figure of evilness reminds us how adorable can be our household reinforcing existent bondage of solidarity. The cynism of West in the war on terror consists in stressing the democratic cultural values at the time they expand their frontiers typically as authoritarian states.

By keeping with the religious fundamentalism, Zizek agree with Huntington that they are moved by resentment. One of the characteristics of Hebrew, Muslim or Christian fundamentalist is the posture of indifference to which they consider „non-believers“. Because they have found the pathway to eternal redemption, fundamentalists are not prone to acts of violence neither terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the way of making politics of Muslim and Christian fundamentalism is a decision in incorrect direction. The atheism seems to be the only which may set free human-kind from the current day-to-day orgy of violence characterizes our societies.

Islamic terrorists has been internalized a so-called inferiority comparing their styles of life with Western. They after all are self-proclaimed fighters of freedom because of unconsciously they need to be liberated from ambiguity. For one hand, terrorists embrace the West's cultures values and technologies as a form of improvement, but for the other they hate West and US because existent ethnocentrism subordinates them in a peripheral position. A self-denigratory belief accompanied with an outstanding arrogance of West give as a result the suicide attacks forecasted throughout the audience. The moot point here lies in this type of behavior does not resolve the trouble. In sharp contrast with Huntington, Zizek strongly believe modern democracy is much more authoritarian than Middle East's Regimes. Otherwise, democracy operates with symbolic and ideological instruments. As Castoriadis put it, the democracy has

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died after the war of Peloponnese. Basically, whenever a political regime is not built on tolerance the most impressive democracy can be really a camouflaged-totalitarianism. Dogmatic spirits are often concerned about the conflagration between the forces of good and evilness.

Following this, R. Bernstein argues that Democracy is more than a ritual accomplished every four years but a style of life. Existent Power does not surface as a pathway towards voluntary domination epitomized in a top-down position; it refers to necessary abilities human beings should develop for transforming jointly their own environment. This seems to be the paradox of totalitarianism which in the name of fraternization carries the destruction of alternative emerging voices. For this instance, Bernstein clarifies that George W. Bush's administration not only looked for expanding a spirit of freedom and democracy – in Iraq and Afghanistan – by means of military interventions but also is wholly convinced that God supports such a crusade. Of course, the belief of main American officials that „they are on the correct side“ appears to be unquestionable whether we dwell on the rhetoric of recent policies against Iraq, Iran and North Korea (Bernstein, 2006). The term terrorism has been coined by Burke who was concerned about the advance of French Revolution. From that day onwards, each Regime has been recurred to „terrorism“ to vindicate their own uncovered demands or by manipulating the mind of voters. In this vein, G. Skoll agrees with Baudrillard and Zizek that terrorism works as a virus going from one to other hosts in so far is predisposed to infect an unprepared victim and so forth. Scholars should make the pertinent endeavors to prevent this virus continues the unbridled propagation (Skoll, 2007). Most likely, by changing the existent provocative tone of discussion of Western about terrorism and Islam seems to be one of most effective measure to mitigate the impacts of terrorism over unprepared civilian population in the World.

Ultimately, in last years US constituted as global force of order and security. Many neo-conservative scholars saw in this a proof of American Strength and the opportunity to expand the principles of freedom and democracy thru the globe. Nonetheless the respect the sovereignty of other States has been surely dissipated afterwards the last invasion to Iraq which has been unilaterally decided by Bush's administration. In this S. Wolin goes on to write that *„the two primary reasons the Bush Administration provided for invading Iraq were false and misleading: 1) the called weapons of mass destruction. In light of anarchy that has prevailed in Iraq since the US occupation, the third rationale for going to war – to establish a stable democratic base in the Middle East – also seems risible. Instead, the real reason behind the invasion appear to have more to do with the traditional goals of Machpolitic: 1) the US desire to establish a firm geopolitical and military footing in the oil-rich Middle East; 2) the drive to offset Iraq's use of WMD as a potential deterrent to American power in the region; and 3) to ensure the security of Israel“*(Wolin, 2010, 151). UN Security Council which is geared to assess the independence and sovereignty of nations failed to prevent US and UK's invasions to Iraq. In this vein, it is important to mention cynical Huntington's account inspired and guided to a considerable others scholars in democracy issues, above all, in study of why democracy has not been yet welcomed as a form of government in Arab Countries (Nathan, 2009) (Diamond, 2010), the assessment of populism in Middle East and Latin America (Whitehead, 2001) (Naim, 2001) (Lucero, 2001), the psychological profile of terrorists (Pech and Slade, 2006) or the supposed lack of personal rights in China (Plattner, 2010).

## **Conclusion**

The thesis of clash of civilization and Third Wave seem to be hard to digest. The line between dictatorships and democracies seems to be tight. Limitations of concepts of democracy and terrorism in Huntington are manifold which have been previously addressed and explained in early sections. The present paper explored the linkage between conservative academician discourses with ethnocentrism. Recently, many scholars have unwittingly nourished the ethnocentric discourse precluding Middle East is the axis of barbarity while US represents the civilization. Of course, the democracy works as the buzzword that symbolically divides civilized from uncivilized nations. The following scheme will help readers to understand better the implicit ethnocentric elements in the thesis of Huntington.

- 1) The third wave of democratization has been a result of the previous experience in totalitarian countries with democracy, a type of „yearning of freedom“;
- 2) Democracy and development should be the best instrument for a fairer redistribution of wealth;
- 3) It is important for US and Europe, functional to their securities, to expand democracy to emergent countries;
- 4) Failures in the adoption of democracy or development are product of cultural incompatibilities with rationalization such as the Islam and its own religious values that impede the democracy;
- 5) The future of Western will be circumscribed to an inevitable clash with East and its resentment;
- 6) Liberal-intellectuals are socialized in the belief the nation-hood is a cultural value that merits to be defended;
- 7) Finally, terrorism must be contemplated as a primary hazard to the style of life in West, a danger which should be eradicated.

To here, we have synthesized and criticized the thought in Samuel Phillips Huntington in regards to democracy, terrorism and emergent Third World. Alternating valuable remarks in S. Zizek and C. Castoriadis, the current work substantially emphasized on the main topics nourish the Anglo-discourse in US and beyond, a much broader deep-seated issue which merits to be discussed in next layouts. Anyway, it is important to mention terrorism and religious fundamentalism were concepts that have not been coined in Middle East as popular wisdom erroneously supposed but in United States during XVIII and XIXth centuries. The protestant fundamentalism has been a form of renouncing to the profane way of life and return to fundamental learning of Bible. The war on terrorism begs us to a question which has not properly tackled to what extent US policies as a Police of the World are less fundamentalist than Iran or North Korea's ones?, what does it really mean the axis of evilness? After all, American are nowadays scared a bio-nuclear bomb explodes in their soil whereas roughly 45 years back their Government unilaterally and abruptly ended a War bombing civilians situated in the Japan cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki avoiding the political costs this represented. This point reminds what Zizek said about ideology; she does not represent an illusion as neo-Marxian scholars precluded but what we silence for legitimating our own behavior and practices.

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### **Civilizácia a demokracia: etnocentrický diskurz v sociálnych vedách**

Vo väčšej, či menšej miere sú všetky civilizácie viac alebo menej etnocentrické. V dnešnej dobe anglicky hovoriace krajiny považujú terorizmus za jednu z hlavných hrozieb, ktorým by mal západ čeliť v nasledujúcich rokoch. Prípád World Trade Center je epizódou, ktorá znamenala koniec jednej a začiatok druhej éry, v ktorej vnímanie bezpečnosti zohráva z ontologického hľadiska veľmi významnú úlohu. Krajiny, ktoré za svoju prioritu zvolili bezpečnosť ako hlavnú stratégiu, zdôrazňujú potrebu preventívnej vojny proti teroristickým bunkám na Strednom východe. V rámci tejto súvislosti, súčasné práce teoreticky skúmajú, do akej miery je anglo-centrismus prítomný v sociálnych vedách. Na základe toho boli preskúmané dve dôležité diela autora - politológa Samuela -Phillipa Huntingtona: *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* a *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. Je dôležité spomenúť, že aj keď v jeho raných dielach sú etnocentrické prvky, neznamená to, že Huntington vedome spracoval argument legitímnosti Bushovej „war-on-terror“. Huntingtonovými tézami niektorí politici často manipulovali.